# The Commons Digest

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Welcome to this most recent installment of the Commons Digest. In this issue, ***Marco Janssen***, IASC North America meeting organizer, reports on the most recent regional meeting held in Arizona, USA, which had more than 120 participants from around the world. Following this report, we introduce three essays looking at commons complexity based on papers presented in the meeting sessions. In the first essay, ***Angela C. M. de Oliveira*** presents not only material on her own work in experimental methods in commons research, but also provides an informative summary of the work of her fellow session members. ***Ryan McAllister*** follows this with his essay looking at economic behavior in the face of uncertainty. The Commons Forum section of this issue closes with ***Michael Schoon*** presenting his work on transboundary protected areas and commons complexity. We hope you enjoy these stimulating essays. In the remainder of the issue we have, as always, a listing for you of Recent Publications. It is also our great pleasure to inform you of a number of announcements of interest to the IASC community; please take a look. And as always, ***Enjoy!***

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### COMMONS FORUM:

**IASC North American Regional Meeting**

# Conference Coordinators

**International Association for the Study of the Commons**

IASC 2011
EUROPEAN MEETING

**IASC European Regional Meeting**

September 14-17, 2011

## The conference is organized jointly by:

Achim Schlüter, from the Leibniz Centre of Tropical Marine Ecology (ZMT) and Jacobs University both in Bremen, Germany

Insa Theesfeld, from the Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO) Halle, Germany

Audun Sandberg, from the Bodø University College, Norway

Ivan Penov and Violeta Dirimanova both from the Agricultural University, Plovdiv, Bulgaria.

Hosted by the Agricultural University Plovdiv, Bulgaria

# Capturing the Complexity of the Commons: Report of the IASC North American Regional Meeting

**Marco Janssen**
**IASC North American Regional Meeting Organizer**

The North American Regional Meeting of the IASC was held from September 30 through October 3, 2010 at the Tempe campus of Arizona State University. About 120 people participated in this event. The majority of them came from the USA, Canada and Mexico, but participants from Europe, Asia and Australia also attended the meeting.

The conference was opened by ASU President Michael Crow who related the work of Lin Ostrom with the challenges of governing a university. This introduced the first keynote speaker, Lin Ostrom, who talked about her recent work on a diagnostic framework to study the complexity of governing social-ecological systems.

Around 100 presentations followed during the coming days. I will provide a brief overview of the major themes of the conference. Details of the conference can be found at the conference website and at the videos of various presentations can be found at IASC youtube channel.

Let's first start with the plenary sessions. The special guest during the conference dinner was William McDonald, a rancher in Cochise County, Arizona. McDonald is one of the leaders of the Malpai Borderlands Group which is a self-organized group led by ranchers to govern the common land in Southeast Arizona and Southwest New Mexico. A fascinating story was given from a practitioner's perspective. It was the group that originally started to coordinate fire management; recently they became the center of national debate due to the murder of a rancher after helping an illegal Mexican trespass his property, a tragedy that shows the increasing complexity of governing the commons on the borders with Mexico.

The conference closed with a plenary address by Arun Agrawal. Agrawal discussed the trend of decentralization of natural resource management. He especially focused on the tension caused by contemporary decentralization strategies to simultaneously increase local powers and reduce local autonomy. Agrawal provided a new conceptual framework, based on a meta study of the literature, to study this tension. The rest of the conference talks were done in parallel sessions. A few trends have been noticed. There were a significant number of contributions using experiments, varying from laboratory and field experiments, to web-based experiments and role-games. Most of these focus on hypothesis testing. Namely, on how decisions

IASC former and funding president, Professor Elinor Ostrom.

of resource users are affected by uncertainty and variability, how information is transmitted between generations, and how experiences affect the ability to solve collective action problems. In the articles in this special issue such presentations are discussed in more detail.

Another theme in the conference was the focus on resilience and adaptation, especially with regard to global climate change. Increasingly effects of climate change and globalization become visible and how can we develop institutional arrangements to anticipate those governance challenges. There were a large number of presentations especially from colleagues of Alaska and Canada on governing the various Arctic commons.

A third theme comes from colleagues outside the Americas who look at the consequences of going from a communistic regime to a market-based economic system. The resulting changes in property rights result in use challenges, especially combined in a world of globalization and climate change. For example, Chuluun Togtokh discussed the challenges of Mongolian rangeland management while Tatiana Kluvánková-Oravská discussed the transformations in forest governance in Slovakia. One of the main challenges is the slow change of social norms and practices together with the rapid change of top-down institutional arrangements and environmental changes.

To address the challenges of economic, social, institutional and environmental transformations, we see various responses on governance approaches. One theme is the use of payment of ecosystem services. Different talks address the challenges of payment schemes, especially in the context of forests and REDD. Another theme is the cross-scale/ cross-border governance of resources, such as water resources between states and countries, or rangelands between countries. To improve the fit between ecological dynamics and institutional arrangements incentive structures and monitoring systems are developed at different levels and scales. Both payments for ecosystem services and cross-scale dynamics


experience principle-agent problems, a topic not explicitly addressed within this conference.

The main focus of talks at IASC was environmental commons. Some topics were covered only tangentially but have much more potential. For example, two talks explicitly dealt with the digital commons, especially open source software. With the increasing importance of digital media this area becomes a research domain in itself. Charles Schweik did a great job in showing how principles of governing environmental resources also hold for digital commons, illustrated by his research on open source software. Another theme that was touched upon was public health. Two talks related to sanitation as a collective action problem, but public health has many more topics on governing common resources, especially within the perspective of the health care debate within the USA. Hopefully we will see more discussion on new commons in future conferences of the IASC.

A special issue of the International Journal of the Commons is under development with a select number of contributions that focus on adaptation and resilience of social-ecological systems. The expectation is this special issue will be available in the Fall of 2011.

Marco.Janssen@asu.edu

# Commonalities in a Sea of Differences

**Angela C. M. de Oliveira**
**Assistant Professor of Resource Economics**
**Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts, USA**

At the 2010 IASC North American Regional meeting I had the pleasure of taking part in a session on experimental methodology.

I was struck by the richness of perspectives: Research teams contributing to this session brought a variety of vantage points and training to the table, including anthropology, economics, evolutionary ecology and political science, just to name a few. Further, even within the rather narrow topic of experimental methodology, researchers employed a variety of methods–traditional lab, classroom, and even the field–to address their questions of interest.

For those of you unfamiliar with experimental methods, these typically work by bringing subjects into a lab (or going to them in the field), having them make decisions in an abstract, context-free environment, paying subjects according to the decisions that they make, and then using their behavior in the more simple lab environment to make some sort of inference about human behavior in general, and about behavior in more complicated by related environments in the 'real world.'

The session participants brought a wide range of perspectives and methods to the table. What was most interesting, however, was not the differences but the similarities. The first theme of the session examined factors affecting voluntary cooperation. My own work (with Catherine Eckel and Rachel Croson) examines the roles that group composition and information have on the ability of groups to voluntarily provide public goods. Previous research has identified a number of social preference types, which appear to be stable types within the population. For example, there are selfish or Nash types who always maximize their own monetary welfare. There are other types, though, who appear to get a 'bonus' from matching the behavior of others. We refer to these individuals as reciprocators or conditional cooperators: They will cooperate if others in their group do as well, but they will refuse to cooperate if others are unwilling to do so. Though other types of individuals exist, these two types have been found to make up the majority of the population in each society studied thus far. We find that groups with more conditional cooperators have slightly higher rates of cooperation, but that the major gains occur when information about group members is available (thus enabling the conditional cooperators to coordinate with each other). However, these gains are not sustained in the long run because individuals react more strongly to disappointments than to surprises.

Each of the papers in this session considered various factors influencing voluntary cooperation in controlled settings. The main factors considered were information, individual heterogeneity, and structural considerations. While my work touches on each of these themes, it was certainly not the only one to do so. Consider the role of information in voluntary provision. One of the many ways information may impact voluntary cooperation is by informing people about their group members, which is what I do. Another way that information may impact voluntary behavior is by suggesting to individuals what they should be doing. This is what Mark Lubell and his coauthors did: Specifically, they examined the impact that intergenerational advice has on 'breeding cooperation' when groups can communicate with each other, and when no such option is available. They find evidence that intergenerational advice can improve the cooperation rates of later generations: But, this result is sensitive to the type of advice passed down. Specifically, since the focus was on breeding cooperation, the experimenters selected positive, cooperative messages to pass down. Negative messages could presumably destroy cooperation in subsequent generations.

Yet another way that information can signal appropriate behavior is employed by Marcel Hurtado and Marco Janssen, who examine behavior in a new web-based 'sanitation game.' In this game, groups of subjects are responsible for keeping a text file clean of "@" symbols. In addition to a baseline, they consider two information conditions, one where subjects are informed about the amount of cleaning done by each group member, and one where subjects receive information about how their groups' cleanliness compares to other groups. Though this new design is still in the pre-testing phase, future results should help shed light on this important issue.

The second key factor considered by this panel was individual heterogeneity. In addition to my own work, the research by Luis Enrique García-Barrios and team examine leadership style in a multi-level, multi-actor role-playing game. Players are grouped into teams who then try to solve a watershed management game. Individuals can choose to focus on their own part of the game (looking for a local solution only) or work together to find a better global solution to the game. Once the game is over, players classify the dominant behavior exhibited by the other people in the group. They find four dominant classifications: Individuals who offer solutions but in a controlling manner (13%), individuals who offer solutions but are not controlling (53%), individuals who are followers (23%) and individuals who do not interact with the group (12%). They find that groups that have higher shares of either the controlling or non-interacting types have a substantially more difficult time working together to find the global solution.

The third factor, structural considerations, is addressed by each research team. As previously described, my team manipulates group compositions and information structure. Lubell's group manipulates group size, endowment, and the availability of within-group communication. Hurtado and Janssen manipulate the rewards structure faced by the groups. Perhaps the most interesting structural manipulation was provided by Lance Howe, James Murphy and Todd Cherry who examines several risk-sharing institutions, which help protect individuals against idiosyncratic risk and (under certain conditions) increases overall cooperation rates. Further, this project ties experimental designs to ethnographic data – truly bridging disciplines to evaluate and understand risk sharing in subsistence economies.

One of the most promising avenues for future research suggested by this session is the interaction between these various factors. What roles do personality and management style have on commons management? Are some styles unilaterally superior for achieving successful and sustainable management, or does the structure of an individual commons and the information available to the group members impact the optimal style? While naturally occurring data allows the researcher to look at these issues on a correlational level, political and ethical considerations do not allow for explicit testing in this area. However, careful experimental designs have the potential to complement these methods and to establish causal links.

While the researchers associated with IASC approach the study of the commons from a wide variety of perspectives, we all are focused on understanding the complexity of the commons. Experiments provide a useful tool in this endeavor. But, more important than any tool, this session highlighted the intellectual gains that come from reaching across disciplines and perspectives to focus on the commonalities that bring us together rather than getting lost in a sea of differences.

adeolive@resecon.umass.edu

# Economic Behaviour in the face of variability and uncertainty: Implications for resource management

***Extended abstract of: Ryan McAllister, John Tisdell, Andrew Reeson and Iain Gordon. Full paper submitted to Ecology and Society (and draft presented at the North American International Association for the Study of the Commons, Arizona State University 2010.)***

Our interest is in the role of cooperation in managing natural resources in semi-arid systems, where resource variability is a fundamental system driver. At the North American International Association for the Study of the Commons, Arizona State University 2010, we presented an economic experiment designed to explore how reciprocity interacts with variability and uncertainty. Our study, built on previous studies of the impact of variable, uncertain and asymmetric information (see full paper), suggests that variability and uncertainty can increase reciprocal behaviour.

Around a billion people from around the globe depend on livestock production for their livelihood. Many of these come from arid or semi-arid areas, where the environment is not sufficiently fertile, moist or predictable for cropping or other intensive forms of agriculture. Historically, the key to thriving in such climates, where livestock based livelihoods are tightly coupled with the environment, is in managing resource variability. Variability can be managed by spreading use across time or space. Temporal approaches, such as supplementary feeding, adapting stock numbers, and saving cash in goods years, are probably most efficient in the industrial grazing systems in Australia's north. Here we focus on spreading resource use across space. Spatial approaches, namely opportunistic livestock mobility, are critical because they add diversity to the set of strategies used to cope with variability (see McAllister et al., 2009).

The Australian tradable grazing rights, or agistment, market facilitates livestock mobility as a human response to a situation where rainfall is so variable in time and space that it is difficult to maintain an economically viable livestock herd on a single management unit.

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Off-creek watering points allowed for substantial increases in cattle grazing intensity in Australia's northern rangelands.

Agistment interactions match pastoralists who have a shortage of forage with pastoralists who have an excess. While each agistment interaction is essentially a one-off business transaction, long-term relationships within agistment networks can facilitate reciprocity and repeated agistment interactions over many years and decades.

The returns from agistment are highly uncertain, particularly for the agistor, the grazier who temporarily moves livestock onto another grazier's property, frequently more than 200km away (Reeson et al., 2008). While some agistment interactions are between trusted friends, many are with strangers. Further, even graziers who know each other will still express mutual uncertainty about how they expect each other to behave in agistment interactions. Agistment markets also tend to be based on informal agreements (or social contacts). The agistor can never be sure about what condition their livestock will be returned in, or the number of livestock losses. Further, because of highly localized environmental variability, as well as variable management by

the agistee (i.e. landholder), attribution of any condition and losses of the agistor's livestock is rarely certain.

Our economic experiment was designed to inform how reciprocity interacts with variability specifically with regards to the uncertainty faced by agistors (with related work focusing on trust rating systems, Reeson et al., 2011). This issue underpins the success of the agistment market. The experiments were conducted with Australian University students in a computer laboratory using specialized experimental software. Participants were divided into two equally sized sets of players, representing livestock owners (agistors) and landholders (agistees).

The participants in the experiment had the opportunity to enter into partnerships, but with no means of entering into or enforcing binding contracts. Participants could choose a partner, or they could choose not to enter the market at all. Participants were anonymous outside of the experiment, and identified within the experiment only by a number. For those who formed partnerships, the first mover in the experiment was given real money and they then decided how much money to transfer to their partner. The second mover decided how much to send back. If the second mover responded, then the amount they transferred was multiplied, representing the gains from trade. In order for the interaction to be profitable to both players, trust is required. Specifically, in this paper we explored the role of variability and uncertainty by including a treatment which varied the factor by which the second mover transfers were multiplied. In this 'Variable' multiplier treatment, the mean of the multiplier remained fixed and known, but only the second mover was informed of the actual multiplier applied during each interaction.

In our study the 'Variable' treatment was associated with more reciprocal behaviour, as indicated by higher transfers and higher payoffs. Repeated interactions between partners boosted reciprocity. Our results also showed players facing variation in their returns (in the 'Variable' treatment) had fewer partners when compared to having fixed returns. This implied variability was associated with more stable partnerships. More work is required to better understand if context really can explain various findings: variability and uncertainty may cause greater transfers and hence more stable relationships. Alternately, variability and uncertainty may conceal the real transfer amounts causing partnerships to persist and hence leading to greater transfers.

In terms of natural resource management, and in particular opportunistic movement of livestock in semi-arid systems, if you do not take risky opportunities to move livestock to country where the productivity is higher, the output of the system is reduced. While opportunistic livestock movements is more commonly associated with traditional grazing systems, even in modern and relatively new grazing cultures, like that in Australia, the ability to exploit variation of resources across space is important. To achieve this, some degree of cooperative behaviour is critical.

Our results, as discussed, suggest that dealing with variability may be embedded within our social norms. And trust seemed to be more strongly rewarded in the more variable system. This provides new domains for research which have special importance for managing natural resources characterised by very high levels of variability.

ryan.mcallister@csiro.au

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# Commons Complexity and Understanding Transboundary Protected Areas

**Michael Schoon**
**Assistant Director - Complex Adaptive Systems Initiative**
**Arizona State University, USA**

Governance of protected areas confronts several sets of issues for park officials. Transboundary parks or protected areas that span international borders magnify these issues even more. Three of the most pressing ones include blurry ownership rights, the complex bundles of goods and services provided, and the variety of scales at which humans interact with protected areas.

These three challenges interact and can be viewed as the results of a complex adaptive system in which emergent phenomena springs from the interactions between system actors. In scientific discussions, the term complexity is often used in two distinct manners. One refers to the study of systems comprised of diverse, interdependent, connected, adapting entities such as the interplay of actors and their related behaviors in protected area governance.

The other usage of the term complexity refers to specific methodological approaches to understanding complex phenomena and typically involves computational approaches to studying them, including laboratory experimentation, agent-based modeling, systems dynamics, or other forms of analysis similar to the other papers in this issue. This paper focuses on the first usage of complexity.

When Yellowstone-style protected areas first appeared in the late Nineteenth Century, managers relied on a simple paramilitary style of conservation that became known as fortress conservation. Since that time, however, ownership rights have blurred.

Co-management arrangements, public-private partnerships in conservation, contractual parks, and transboundary parks all complicate the exact ownership of parks and who has the authority to make decisions on various aspects of governance and with whom. Today's complex matrix of land tenure and usage within and across a protected area compounds the problem. A simple example of human-wildlife conflict shows how multiple ownership, land tenure rights, and diverse forms of resource usage interact in a transboundary park and create confusion for land managers.

With humans and wildlife interacting in a variety of ways in a landscape comprised of national parks, communal lands, multiple-use conservation areas, and buffer zones between restricted areas and local communities, decision-making gets confusing in the interaction between actors managing different areas, as wildlife move between patches. Who is allowed to take wildlife and how people may respond to conflict with wildlife may vary between jurisdictions. However, the responses in any given jurisdiction reverberate across the landscape.

Wildlife sources and sinks may emerge. Separating ownership into access, usage, management, exclusion, and alienation rights begins to clarify the issue (Schlager and Ostrom, 1997). Of course, this is only a beginning to resolving the problem.

The second major governance challenge in transboundary conservation projects is that, like other commons dilemmas, the types of goods and services provided by transboundary protected areas go far beyond the provision of a single good or service.

Unlike trying to manage a forest for the harvest of a mono-culture, managing a transboundary protected area is more like managing a forest for multiple types of timber, non-timber forest products, and the provision of various

ecosystem services like erosion control and water filtration, as well as maintaining cultural benefits.

In the same way, transboundary protected areas are complex bundles of goods and services which managers may array in part based on differences of excludability and subtractability. As a result, protected area management presents interesting challenges. Governance arrangements that work well with one resource type, such as the sustainable harvesting of medicinal plants that share many traits with typical private goods, may struggle with another, like biodiversity conservation that can be viewed as a public good. This is further compounded because of the multiple actors advocating transboundary conservation. Many advocates of transboundary parks share goals of biodiversity conservation, economic development, and the promotion of peace, yet, when looking at the details, different actor groups favor different goal prioritizations.

Many of the conservation goals involve public goods while the development goals often include private goods or are dependent on common-pool resources. Likewise, managing for a club good, like tourism (and tourists' desires to see charismatic mega-fauna), directly impacts biodiversity goals. These differences have profound implications for park governance. In short, there are often trade-offs in the provisioning of one set of desired goods and services at the expense of others, and the type of governance regime most be effective at managing one type of goods (e.g. markets for private goods), may prove disastrous for another set of goods and services.

Related to the issue of governing for multiple types of goods and services, the third challenge is that the nature of the goods and services offered by protected areas often provides benefits at scales different from the scale where costs accrue. Just as the conservation goals and the development goals differ in the types of goods and services desired, the conservation benefits often occur at a regional or global scale, while the costs collect at a local scale. Development goals may or may not match the scale of benefits and costs at a given level, but again it is not clear that costs and benefits will cancel out or that one group at a local level will not benefit at the expense of another.
These local costs and benefits can play out between genders, age groups, education levels, professions, and classes. To complicate this further, some things that are seen as a public good at one level may be viewed as a CPR at another. For instance, a population of a species may be seen as preserving biodiversity and/or genetic diversity at broader scales while being seen at a local level as a food source, historically managed as a CPR. Ultimately, much of today's controversy surrounding transboundary protected areas comes, in part, from the differences between beneficiaries – who pays and who profits.

The intent of this editorial is twofold. First, by sub-dividing protected areas into a variety of types of goods and services, protected area officials can begin to see how governance arrangements need to be structured differently between actor groups for the multitudes of different goods and services provided by protected areas. This does not eliminate contention, power dynamics, or dissent between groups. Instead, it is meant to add awareness to governance choices. Second, attempting to govern a range of goods and services in a centralized, top-down manner, as in many fortress conservation projects, has not often achieved their desired results. Recent trends have acknowledged this shortcoming and have begun to remedy it. New approaches try to take advantage of local knowledge, reward local monitoring and enforcement of rules, and push governance to multiple decision-making authorities.

These include community-based natural resource management programs, the move to contractual parks and other co-management arrangements, cross-border partnerships, corridor conservation programs, and transboundary protected areas. These types of programs often allow and even encourage more decentralized governance arrangements that nest within broader governing bodies. Often the challenges come from finding the appropriate level of governance for a specific issue and figuring out when, where, and

how to collaborate with other governance institutions across jurisdictional boundaries. This is important regardless of whether the boundaries are between municipalities, tribes, agencies, or countries. In all of these cases the key to understanding the appropriate level for governance and when to cooperate with cross-border partnerships entails balancing transaction costs with efficiency gains.

Negotiating and coming to agreement between cross-border partners requires time, energy, and resources. Only when the benefits of collaboration exceed the costs should these efforts be undertaken. While this is a simplistic explanation of a complex task, it points in the direction of successful polycentric governance and governing at the appropriate level of response.

Polycentric governance provides one means of improving the response to the task of the management of the complex bundle of goods and services known as a transboundary protected area.

mlschoon@indiana.edu

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# Recent Publications

## Emily Castle

**Director of the Digital Library of the Commons, Indiana University**

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**IASC 2010 North America Regional Meeting: Conference Papers**

IASC 2011
EUROPEAN MEETING

**International Association for the Study of the Commons IASC European Meeting**

September 14-17, 2011
Hosted by the Agricultural University Plovdiv, Bulgaria
Theme: **Shared Resources in a Rapidly Changing World**

The regional meeting of the EU branch of the IASC will have as its theme "Shared Resources in a Rapidly Changing World", reflecting the emphasis on the currently well recognized fact that many if not most resources (e.g. natural resources, social capital, knowledge) require a shared management regime.

The aim of the European Regional Meeting 2011 is to strengthen the network of European researchers who are investigating those shared management regimes. The conference site, one of the conference themes and the field excursion will highlight in particular the special challenges of (natural) resource management regimes in the post-socialist countries.

Besides the regional focus of Eastern Europe, the conference is open to all European scientists and actors active in the policy domain who work on property regimes and who contribute to discuss new modes of governance for shared resources.

The conference is organized in 4 subthemes:

- Multiple Drivers to Change in Common Management
- Post Socialist Commons: the Road Ahead
- Methods Investigating Complex Common Property Regimes
- Multi-level Governance

**Forest Tenure, Governance and Enterprise: Experiences and Opportunities for Asia in a Changing Context**
**July 11-15 2011**

The Santosa Villas & Resort: Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia

ITTO

RIGHTS + RESOURCES

Organizers: Rights and Resources Initiative (RRI), International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO)

Hosted by: Ministry of Forestry, Republic of Indonesia

In collaboration with: EFI-FLEGT, World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF), RECOFTC, Samdhana Institute, Forest Peoples Programme, HuMa, AMAN, FKKM, Global Alliance of Community Forestry (GACF)

***Background and Objectives:***

It is now widely recognized that forest tenure and related governance reforms are necessary for improvements in people's livelihoods, for the attainment of sustainable forest management and conservation, as well as for addressing climate change. Forest tenure policies and legal frameworks are highly diverse in the Asia-Pacific region, with some countries moving ahead and others still considering reform. As such, much can be learnt from engaging in a review of these legal and regulatory transformations so as to inform the development of forest policies involving community-based enterprise development and REDD+ within emergent dynamics at play in the region.

The Conference aims to promote an in-depth assessment of the relationship between forest tenure, sustainable forest management and income generating enterprises to promote action across a range of Asian countries. It will bring together a wide variety of stakeholders

from the Asia-Pacific region and beyond and follow-up to RRI-ITTO organized international tenure conferences held in **Acre, Brazil** in July 2007, and **Yaoundé, Cameroon** in May 2009.

***Expected Outcomes:***

- Improved Asian knowledge base and information sharing on innovative forest tenure policies, legislation, institutional arrangements, and other initiatives in a changing national and global context, with special reference to climate change;
- New understanding of the implications of tenure trends and development of community forest management for the Asia-Pacific countries;
- Asia-wide reflection on the experience of harnessing forest tenure and resource rights in selected Asian countries (China, Indonesia, Nepal, Thailand, Vietnam) to enhance sustainable forest management and livelihood improvement of forest dependent communities;
- Enhanced mechanisms for stakeholders participation and equitable sharing of benefits from the sustainable use and conservation of tropical forest resources including gender equity; and
- Understanding of the status of reforms and initiatives underway in Indonesia by government and civil society organizations and lessons learned for new recommendations for the next steps in reforms.

***Participants and Speakers:***

About 200 participants expected: 100 international and regional, 100 from Indonesia, including government and NGO leaders from forested Asia-Pacific countries, regional Asian policy bodies (ASEAN etc), members of civil society and community organizations, researchers, private sector and industry organizations, international NGOs and the development community.

For further information please contact: Nayna Jhaveri or Ganga Ram Dahal at RRI; Eduardo Mansur or Pei Sin Tong at ITTO.

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Small-scale fisheries make up a large proportion of world's fisheries, both by catch and participation. Effective management is essential to ensure access to fish for food and income. Covering social and economic aspects of the fishery management and governance challenge, this book provides guidance on innovative and alternative management measures and methods for small-scale fisheries. The book covers key topics such as rights, policy, co-management, communications and trade, and is an important reference for researchers and students in fisheries science and management as well as fisheries research organizations and policymakers.

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## Invitation From Elinor Ostrom

May 02, 2011

To Colleagues Interested in The Commons:

Scholars interested in a variety of common-pool resources and public goods are scattered across the world and in multiple disciplines interested in diverse common resources. We were fortunate to be able to establish the International Association for the Study of The Commons two decades ago. This has provided us a forum that disciplinary meetings do not. We can engage in a very serious and cumulative discussion of how diverse groups at multiple scales have or have not solved problems of great importance.

IASC is now itself a "global commons" committed to the production and dissemination of knowledge, which is a "public good," about how many diverse institutions help or hinder the solutions of common-pool resources, in complex social-ecological settings. As members, we also face a social dilemma in keeping IASC funded. Without our contributions, IASC is not sustainable over time.

I have learned so much from being a member of IASC, and I hope that you will join in this effort by renewing your membership or becoming a member.

Regards,

**Elinor Ostrom**
**Former President and Current**
**Active Member of IASC**

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## Membership Drive

Dear members,

Thank you for supporting the International Association for the Study of the Commons (IASC) by means of your membership. IASC is itself a commons, and depends on its membership dues for many of the critical activities it undertakes, such as organizing the Global Conferences and the Regional and Thematic Meetings, publishing *The Commons Digest* and the *International Journal of the Commons*, supporting the Digital Library of the Commons and other networking among IASC members that we are working on. Your support has increased the financial viability of the organization over these years.

Elinor Ostrom's Nobel Prize and the increasing attention to the commons have given our association a big lift, but we can't rest on our laurels. We need to move forward to meet the (old and) new challenges to the commons.

The individual membership dues are based on incomes as listed in the categories below:

- Incomes US $19,999 and below dues are $20.00
- Incomes US $20,000-49,999 dues are $75.00
- Incomes US $50,000-79,999 dues are $120.00
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You can make your renewal in a clear and simple way in the following electronic address:

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If you do not have a credit card, we have two alternatives for you to pay your membership. You can send a check by mail or pay through a bank transfer (wire transfer) to our account.
For more information about these options, please contact Gabriela Ortiz

**gabrielaortiz@iasc-commons.org**

Finally, we invite you to visit IASC's new website at:

**www.iasc-commons.org**

Our site is being upgraded to provide you with better information about: conferences, organization's activities, publications (*The Commons Digest* and *International Journal of the Commons*), and contacts with other members.

We look forward to your continued support!

Best Regards,

**Susan J. Buck**

**President, International Association**
**for the Study of the Commons (IASC)**

**iasc@iasc-commons.org**